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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
W. Hamilton Bryson*
This article considers recent developments in the field of Vir-
ginia civil procedure and practice, including statutes, rules of
court, and opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia and the
Court of Appeals of Virginia that have appeared between May
1986 and May 1987. This article also comments on cases in
volumes five through eight of Virginia Circuit Court Opinions,
many of which were decided before 1986. It is appropriate to men-
tion them here since they were only recently made generally avail-
able through publication. In order to facilitate the discussion of
numerous Virginia Code sections, they will be referred to in the
text by their section numbers only.
I. APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURTS
In an appeal from a district court, an appeal bond must be
posted within thirty days of the lower court judgment in order to
perfect the appeal.1 Upon an appeal from a general district court,
the plaintiff may not amend the ad damnum in the circuit court to
a sum greater than the jurisdiction of the district court.' When a
judgment of a general district court in favor of one defendant but
against another is appealed, all issues will be tried de novo.3 How-
ever, in an appeal from a district court upon a denial of a motion
for a new trial, the circuit court will only consider the judge's de-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond; author of HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE (1983); editor of VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Sydney
College; LL.B., 1967, Harvard University; LL.M., 1968, University of Virginia; Ph.D., 1972,
Cambridge University.
1. Bowles v. Jones, 6 Va. Cir. 321 (Fairfax County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Dist.
Ct. 1986); Swimley v. Lamp, 4 Va. Cir. 22 (Frederick County 1980); Bland v. Byer, 5 Va. Cir.
463 (Alleghany County 1975); Pentagon Realty Co. v. Oddenino, 5 Va. Cir. 448 (Arlington
County 1974) (construing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-106, -107 (Repl. Vol. 1982)).
2. Federal Real Estate & Inv. Corp. v. Carl Frye's Mobile Home & Modular Housing, Inc.,
5 Va. Cir. 11 (Frederick County 1980).
3. Nanney v. Navy Car Storage, Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 397 (Norfolk 1969).
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nial of that motion.4 A general district court may not set aside a
judgment under section 16.1-97 after thirty days have passed.'
After a circuit court has transferred the determination of child
support, custody, and visitation to a juvenile and domestic rela-
tions court, it loses jurisdiction over those matters except on ap-
peal from the lower court. The circuit court will not reconsider
such matters when it determines the issue of divorce. The support
orders of a juvenile court can be appealed to the circuit court or
modified by the juvenile court, but the divorce suit under section
20-79(b) cannot be used as an alternative to the appellate proce-
dure.' Where matters relating to the custody and support of chil-
dren are transferred to the juvenile and domestic relations district
court of another county or city, appeals from such courts lie to the
circuit court that had jurisdiction in the first instance.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS AND NOTICE OF CLAIMS
A. General
A person can have more than one place of abode, but service of
process by tacking on the door of a house that is not any of the
defendant's vsual places of abode is invalid.8 A foreign corporation
authorized to do business in Virginia can be served through any
agent where such person resides;9 however, substituted service of
process by posting on the door of the residence of the agent of the
defendant corporation is invalid.'"
The failure to serve process within one year after filing a motion
for judgment will result in a dismissal under Rule 3:3.1" Upon such
a motion, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that he has exer-
cised due diligence in attempting to have process served. Due dili-
gence requires resort to the long arm statutes to obtain service.' 2 A
4. Plaza Motors, Inc. v. Walker, 8 Va. Cir. 451 (Richmond 1987); Showman v. Mumaw, 6
Va. Cir. 43 (Shenandoah County 1983); Lake Holiday Country Club v. Morton, 6 Va. Cir. 21
(Winchester 1982).
5. Rigg v. Old, 6 Va. Cir. 9 (Norfolk 1981).
6. Butterworth v. Butterworth, 8 Va. Cir. 397 (Roanoke 1987); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 7 Va.
Cir. 26 (Henrico County 1980) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79 (Repl. Vol. 1983)).
7. Martin v. Carter, 8 Va. Cir. 285 (Henrico County 1986).
8. Coons & Thompson, Inc. v. Lapin, 7 Va. Cir. 73 (Virginia Beach 1981).
9. Butler v. Howard Johnson's, 6 Va. Cir. 34 (Spotsylvania County 1983) (interpreting VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
10. Lamb v. Seaboard Citizens Nat'l Bank, 6 Va. Cir. 436 (Virginia Beach 1967).
11. Christian v. Hautz, 6 Va. Cir. 486 (Norfolk 1972) (citing VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:3).
12. Longus v. Holben, 5 Va. Cir. 57 (Arlington County 1982).
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motion to dismiss for failure to serve process within one year will
be overruled where the defendant was aware that he had been
sued. 13 A defendant can always make a voluntary appearance to
respond and defend his interests.
The issue of paternity involves an in personam adjudication
which cannot be made where process has been obtained by order of
publication against an out-of-state defendant.1
4
An objection to personal or active jurisdiction must be raised by
a motion to quash process or a motion in abatement filed simulta-
neously with or prior to any demurrer. 5 If an objection to service
of process is made at the same time that a notice is given to take
depositions to prove improper service, any improper service is not
waived by the general appearance. If a person is in Virginia solely
to testify by deposition, he is immune from service of process. 6
The curing statute, section 8.01-288, will not apply to defective
service of process where the party did not actually receive notice in
writing. Service on a party's secretary is insufficient unless the sec-
retary was authorized to accept service. 17
Several statutes' s were recently amended by the General Assem-
bly so that service or acceptance of service of process in divorce
and annulment cases is accomplished by the same procedures and
in the same manner as all other civil suits. The former restrictions
for divorce and annulment suits were removed.
B. Long Arm Statute
The Long Arm Statute is a single transaction statute. However,
the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privi-
lege of transacting business in Virginia in order to have minimum
contacts with Virginia. 9 Where the defendant acted directly in
Virginia through its agent, the plaintiff, the Virginia courts can get
jurisdiction over the defendant under the Long Arm Statute. °
13. Spinella v. Lynch, 6 Va. Cir. 445 (Norfolk 1969).
14. Nichols v. Nichols, 5 Va. Cir. 478 (Alleghany County 1976).
15. Cardinal Airlines v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 5 Va. Cir. 465 (Richmond 1975).
16. Walker v. Witt, 6 Va. Cir. 464 (Norfolk 1970).
17. Lancaster & Clark Constr. Co. v. Davis, 7 Va. Cir. 463 (Richmond 1976).
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-288, -320, -327, -328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1987); id.
§§ 20-99, -99.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
19. Goehring v. Roberts, 5 Va. Cir. 234 (Alexandria 1985).
20. C & P Air Conditioning Corp. v. Sure Air Ltd., 6 Va. Cir. 480 (Norfolk 1970) (inter-
preting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Cure. Supp. 1986)).
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However, a series of telephone calls into Virginia giving orders for
the shipment of goods is insufficient to establish "minimum con-
tacts" with Virginia to give jurisdiction under the Long Arm
Statute.2
An out-of-state corporation which used telephone calls and let-
ters to cause an in-state employee to breach his contract with his
in-state employer is not subject to the jurisdiction of in-state
courts. Where a Virginia plaintiff and a Florida defendant negoti-
ated by mail and telephone and then entered into a contract in
Florida, there were not enough contacts with Virginia to give a Vir-
ginia court jurisdiction.2 However, an out-of-state corporation act-
ing in state through its agent is covered by the Long Arm
Statute.2
C. Service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth
In recent years, the "long-arm" jurisdiction of the Virginia trial
courts has grown to avalanche proportions, and the village in the
valley that is threatened thereby is the Office of the Secretary of
the Commonwealth. Creditors and their attorneys have realized
that the Long Arm Statute applies to defaulting debtors who are
domiciliaries of Virginia who have absconded and cannot be
found.24 The Long Arm Statute gives jurisdiction to the general
district courts as well as to the circuit courts. The "long-arm" ju-
risdiction of the courts is obtained by serving the process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, who is the statutory agent of a
defendant who cannot be located and served in Virginia. Having
been served with process, the Secretary of the Commonwealth is
then under a statutory duty to mail the process to the defendant at
his last known address and to send a certificate of compliance to
the clerk of the court.25
The recent great increase in the serving of process through the
Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth has raised several se-
rious problems. The General Assembly dealt with these problems
21. Onduline U.S.A. v. Baker, 6 Va. Cir. 49 (Spotsylvania County 1983) (construing VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)); ESMA Chemicals, Inc. v. Norfolk Dental
Labs., Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 29 (Virginia Beach 1982) (construing former VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-119
(Repl. Vol. 1973), present § 13.1-758 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1987)).
22. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Bailey, 7 Va. Cir. 461 (Norfolk 1976).
23. North Fork Shenandoah, Inc. v. Bunning, 7 Va. Cir. 327 (Warren County 1986).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
25. See id. §§ 8.01-328 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986).
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at its last session, by amending section 8.01-329 in several signifi-
cant ways.
A new sentence was added to the end of subsection Al to em-
phasize and to define the "due diligence" requirement of this stat-
ute. When the defendant is a resident of the Commonwealth, the
plaintiff must file an affidavit that he was unable to locate the de-
fendant "after exercising due diligence" to find him. When the
plaintiff files such an affidavit, he is now certifying that he has at-
tempted service in the normal manner pursuant to section 8.01-293
and also that he "has made a bona fide attempt to determine the
actual place of abode or location" of the defendant. It appears that
the absolute minimum search would include the telephone direc-
tory and the city directory. Proof of failure to exercise due dili-
gence to find the defendant will invalidate the service of process
and thus defeat the jurisdiction of the court.2 6 It is to be
remembered that service of process under the Long Arm Statute is
an "extraordinary" procedure to be used only when the normal
methods fail. The affidavit of due diligence is not a mere formality
to be signed with no thought given to its truth.
An amendment to subsection B allows the plaintiff to mail the
process, the pleadings, and the affidavit of due diligence directly to
the office in Richmond, thereby serving the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth. The plaintiff can save time and control the procedure
by avoiding the local clerks' and sheriffs' offices. The procedure
will also relieve the Sheriff of the City of Richmond from the enor-
mous burden of officially serving the Secretary with these papers
received from all parts of the state. In the past, the Secretary re-
ceived these papers through official service and by informal deliv-
ery and mailing. The Secretary voluntarily accepted process, and
this was a cure for any defect. Now, delivery by hand or by mail is
expressly permitted.
Another amendment to subsection B allows the Secretary of the
Commonwealth to send the papers to the defendant by first class
mail instead of registered or certified mail. Although there will be
no official notice in the Secretary's file that a mailing was not suc-
cessful, the undeliverable letter itself will be returned by the post
office. If the plaintiff wants a receipt from the post office to show
to the court, he can send a copy of the papers by certified mail
himself. The purpose of deleting the old requirement of registered
26. Mannino v. Manley, 8 Va. Cir. 535 (Richmond 1979).
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or certified mail was the belief that first class mail is more effective
notice because many persons refuse to accept registered mail. Does
good news ever come by registered mail? Are checks ever sent by
certified mail?
The most fundamental change in the law of service of process is
the new sentence that was added to the end of subsection B. The
general rule is that service of process is effective on the date that it
was given to the defendant or his statutory agent. The twenty-one
day period of Rules 2:7 and 3:5 regarding a defendant's default be-
gins to run from that date. In the recent past, the inadequate staff-
ing of the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth has re-
sulted in delays between the date of service on the Secretary and
the mailing of the papers to the defendant. Although it is not
known to have happened, it is not unimaginable that the papers
might be mailed after the twenty-one day period for the defend-
ant's response has expired. A judge has the discretion under Rule
1:9 to allow a late response. However, if the defendant does not
receive the papers before the plaintiff moves for default judgment,
he will be unaware of his need to make a motion for leave to file
late. In this situation or if the court should refuse to allow a late
response and default judgment goes against the defendant, the
Commonwealth might be liable. This would be negligence on the
part of the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth in per-
forming the non-discretionary duty of mailing the papers to the
defendant.
The new sentence at the end of subsection B avoids this poten-
tial liability and gives an additional measure of fairness to defend-
ants by giving them the full twenty-one days notice in fact. It
dates the effectiveness of the service on the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth from the time that the Secretary's certificate of compli-
ance is filed in the clerk's office of the trial court where the action
is pending. Thus, the time that it takes the Secretary's office to
complete the handling and mailing of the papers is not counted
against the defendant's twenty-one day period to find an attorney
and make a response.
Other amendments clarify the statute by expressly permitting
agents of a plaintiff to make the affidavit and to deliver the papers
to the Secretary. By changing the date of the effectiveness of the
process, the amendment gives the Secretary of the Commonwealth
some leeway if a backlog should develop. However, it does not
solve the problem of service of process in the general district courts
[Vol. 21:667
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where the time of default is the return day set by the plaintiff. In
many past instances, the Office of the Secretary has received pro-
cess within a day or two of the return day, making it impossible to
give fair notice to the defendant.2" A new subsection B1 states that
process that is received by the Secretary within ten days of the
return date is invalid. The Secretary will reject it and return it and
the fee to the plaintiff. A notice of the rejection will then be sent to
the clerk of the general district court. This amendment, like the
others, will increase the fairness of the procedure to defendants
who are being served by this statutory method.2"
D. Virginia Tort Claims Act
The Commonwealth is liable for the torts of its employees under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, but no recovery can exceed
$25,000 or a sum for which the Commonwealth is insured. 2 The
Commonwealth can and does insure its employees in addition to
insuring itself, but this is a matter of the liability of and indemnity
to the employee, not to the Commonwealth itself.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims under the Tort
Claims Act that are not prosecuted according to the requirements
of that statute.3 0 For example, actual notice is not an acceptable
substitute for substantial compliance with the notice requirements
of the Tort Claims Act. 1 A state prisoner claiming to have been
injured by the negligent computation of his parole eligibility date
must file a written statement giving the nature of the claim and
the time and place that it occurred. The statement must be given
to the head of the Department of Corrections within six months.2
The notice of a claim under the Virginia Tort Claims Act must be
given to the Attorney General. The court cannot deem anyone to
be the statutory agent of the Attorney General.
27. Note that process in a general district court must be served five days before the re-
turn date. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-80 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
28. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Myra Federspiel, Deputy Sec-
retary of the Commonwealth, and Gregory J. Haley, Assistant Attorney General, with this
section.
29. Trimyer v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. Cir. 209 (Henrico County 1984) (construing VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Curn. Supp. 1986)).
30. Gouldthorpe v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. Cir. 295 (Nottoway County 1986); United Va.
Bank v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. Cir. 262 (Richmond 1985).
31. Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. Cir. 312 (Augusta County 1986).
32. Jones v. Vassar, 6 Va. Cir. 167 (Richmond 1984).
33. Greene v. Lynch, 5 Va. Cir. 315 (Richmond 1986) (construing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-195.6 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
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The requirement of section 8.01-222 that notice be given to a
city of a claim for damages for negligence is not jurisdictional. The
exact location of the accident need not be pinpointed as long as
the city has fair notice and can find or has already found it.34
III. VENUE
In an action against an unknown uninsured motorist, venue is
determined as if the insurance carrier were the defendant.3 5 In a
suit where most of the parties and witnesses reside or are em-
ployed in another city and the transaction occurred in that same
city, the court will transfer the suit to that city as a more conven-
ient forum."6 Even though venue is proper under section 8.01-263
relating to multiple parties, the court has the discretion to transfer
the case to a more convenient forum under section 8.01-265. s7 A
corporation can have a residence for the purpose of the venue stat-
ute dealing with multiple parties, and where there are multiple
corporate defendants, venue must be correct as to at least one resi-
dent corporation. A case arising out of the same transaction as an-
other case in another forum should be transferred to that other
forum as a matter of judicial economy.38
The Virginia forum non conveniens statute applies to the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) actions that are filed in
state courts.3 The constitutionality of the forum non conveniens
statute, which prohibits a court from dismissing a suit to a more
convenient forum in another state, has been recently questioned 0
and defended.41
A new subsection C was added recently to section 20-96 to allow
a judge in a divorce or annulment suit to transfer the case to an-
other forum that has jurisdiction under the Code.42 It appears that
34. Benson v. City of Fredericksburg, 6 Va. Cir. 122 (Fredericksburg 1984).
35. Howell v. Doe, 5 Va. Cir. 418 (Richmond 1967).
36. Sea Mist, Inc. v. Gloucester Trawlers, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 33 (Norfolk 1982).
37. Simmons v. Drew, 5 Va. Cir. 519 (Virginia Beach 1978).
38. Claypoole v. Ag-Chem Equip. Co., 6 Va. Cir. 404 (Richmond 1986) (construing VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-263(1), -265 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
39. Spencer v. N. & W. Ry., 8 Va. Cir. 12 (Norfolk 1980). The provisions of F.E.L.A. are
codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 to 60 (1982).
40. Towe v. Southern Ry., 6 Va. Cir. 422 (Norfolk 1986).
41. Poston v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 6 Va. Cir. 548 (Norfolk 1979) (construing VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96(C) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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this new power can be exercised only where the suit was originally
brought in a correct forum and there is another correct forum to
receive the case. Since venue is jurisdictional in divorce cases, it
would seem that the court would not have the power to make an
order of transfer if the suit was brought in an incorrect forum. In
the present era of no-fault divorce, it may be that the principle
that venue is mandatory and jurisdictional because divorce is a
purely statutory right should be changed. Arguably, venue in di-
vorce suits should be made a matter of preferred venue under sec-
tion 8.01-261. 41 This would prevent an inadvertent choice of the
wrong forum from making the entire divorce proceeding void. It
would allow the parties to waive the venue requirements if they
both chose to do so.
Actions that are subject to the federal Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act (the "Act") must be brought where the defendant con-
sumer "signed the contract sued upon" or where he resides.44 In
1986, this Act was amended to include attorneys collecting a debt
on behalf of a client. Thus, banks, merchants, and others who hire
lawyers to sue their debtors may be indirectly brought within the
ambit of this federal venue requirement.4 Apparently, the purpose
of the 1986 amendment was to include attorneys who are in the
business of collecting debts of others and are acting as collection
agencies. The Act is so broadly drafted, however, that it appears to
include all attorneys who are representing a plaintiff who is suing
on a debt. Numerous anomalies and problems have been created,
but they lead into the area of debtor-creditor relations and are
thus beyond the scope of this article.
IV. PARTIES
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, the trustee and the benefi-
ciary of an antecedent deed of trust on the land are necessary
parties.4
The requirement of section 53-307, that a person convicted of a
43. This section lists forums designated preferred venues for a variety of actions. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-261 (Cum. Supp. 1987). Venue in divorce proceedings is explicitly ex-
cluded. Id. § 8.01-259 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2) (1982).
45. Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)); Hazard,
Debtors Who Don't Act Waive Their Rights, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 14, 1987, at
C1-2.
46. Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986).
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felony and sentenced to prison may not sue but his litigation must
be brought by a committee, is procedural, not jurisdictional, and
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended to substitute the
committee as plaintiff.41
Where multiple plaintiffs allege separate and distinct claims,
there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Co-plaintiffs must have
joint interests.48 There is a misjoinder of defendants where a mo-
tion for judgment alleges independent claims against separate de-
fendants not alleged to be jointly liable.49
An intervenor in a suit cannot assert rights and defenses belong-
ing to other parties that were not asserted by those other parties.5
A proper party plaintiff cannot be substituted in the place of a
plaintiff who had no standing to sue because he had no cause of
action against the defendant. To substitute a new party who has
developed a cause of action or a different cause of action is very
different from joining or substituting a new party who has the
same cause of action already in litigation.'
Section 16.1-77 was recently amended to give the general district
courts the jurisdiction to decide suits in interpleader if the suit
does not require the issuance of an injunction. General district
courts do not have injunctive powers.
An insurance company that has become subrogated to the rights
of its insured may sue in its own name or in the name of its
insured.5"
V. PLEADING
A. General
A plaintiff cannot avoid the requirement of a medical malprac-
tice review panel by couching his claim in contractual terms. 3
47. Cassell v. Bundy Truck Line, Inc., 5 Va. Cir. 475 (Botetourt County 1976).
48. Dixon v. Robertson, 5 Va. Cir. 544 (Henrico County 1979).
49. Rasnick v. Pittston Co., 5 Va. Cir. 336 (Wise County 1986); Pierce v. AVCO Fin.
Servs., 7 Va. Cir. 420 (Richmond 1972).
50. Norfolk Division of Social Serv. v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533
(1986).
51. Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 231 Va. 440, 344 S.E.2d
913 (1986).
52. Harbour v. Travelers Indem. Co., 7 Va. Cir. 406 (Norfolk 1971) (interpreting VA. CoDE
ANN. § 38.1-31.2 (Repl. Vol. 1981), present § 38.2-207 (Rep. Vol. 1986)).
53. Ferguson v. Ford, 5 Va. Cir. 65 (Lynchburg 1982).
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As a general rule, a single cause of action cannot be divided and
sued in several actions. However, a defendant may consent to the
splitting of a cause of action, and such consent can be implied by
the defendant's conduct. 4
A plaintiff will not be allowed to amend his pleadings after a
verdict to increase the ad damnum clause where the claim is for
unliquidated damages. As the Virginia Supreme Court ruled,
[i]t would be unfair to cause a defendant and other interested par-
ties to believe that plaintiff's claim is for a certain amount and no
more only to let the jury award a greater amount. Such a procedure
would disrupt the orderly conduct of trials and bring uncertainty to
defendants and others who may be called upon to pay the amounts
awarded against defendants.55
A bill of particulars will not be ordered when the motion for
judgment gives the defendant sufficient information to prepare a
defense. A bill of particulars will not require a plaintiff to go into
matters of evidence. 6
The doctrine of laches cannot be applied as a defense to an ac-
tion at common law, nor can laches be imputed to a municipal cor-
poration acting in its governmental capacity.57
Where a bill of complaint was filed before the effective date of a
statute that did not affect "pending litigation," a cross-bill filed
after the date of the statute is not governed by the statute since it
becomes a part of the litigation already pending.5 8
An unliquidated counterclaim in the nature of an offset can be
asserted under Rule 3:8 .5 The time for filing counterclaims in
cases appealed or removed from the district courts is not con-
trolled by any rule of court or statute but is governed by the judi-
cial discretion of the circuit court judge.".
A judgment may be set aside for fraud in the procurement of the
54. Norfolk Wholesale Floral Corp. v. Fraim, 6 Va. Cir. 438 (Norfolk 1968).
55. Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 Va. 464, 469, 344 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1986).
56. Commonwealth v. Smith, 7 Va. Cir. 103 (Norfolk 1982); Commonwealth v. Rasnake, 7
Va. Cir. 521 (Norfolk 1978); Cephas v. Flowers, 5 Va. Cir. 414 (Richmond 1962).
57. City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 164, 349 S.E.2d 351, 354
(1986).
58. Bowen v. Bowen, 6 Va. Cir. 71 (Newport News 1983).
59. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Carper & Mace Corp., 7 Va. Cir. 385 (Richmond 1963).
60. G & G Roofing Co. v. Harris, 5 Va. Cir. 332 (Clarke County 1986).
1987]
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judgment but not for fraud in the procurement of the underlying
contract. In an action of debt on a foreign judgment, no counter-
claim barred by the foreign judgment can be prosecuted in
Virginia."
A defendant who acts in good faith and with care, and sends the
process to his insurance company, will be allowed to file a late an-
swer.2 A plaintiff will be granted leave to file a late reply where
there will be no surprise or prejudice to the defendant.63
B. Joinder
Two separate plaintiffs having separate and distinct claims aris-
ing out of the same transaction may not unite such claims in a
single action against a defendant. 4 A motion for judgment which
joins two defendants but does not allege joint liability is subject to
demurrer.6 5
A plaintiff may join a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
with a suit for a divorce under Rule 1:4 if the claims arise out of
the same transaction.6 On the other hand, a cross-bill for alimony
is not germane to a bill for the partition of property. A court can
divide marital property under section 20-107.3 only in a divorce
proceeding.6 7
The statute that grants a right of action for death by wrongful
act 8 prevents the operation of the survival statute 9 from keeping
alive any right of action resulting from the same act that caused
the wrongful death. Thus, in a wrongful death case, the estate of
the decedent and its creditors lose any compensation for pain and
suffering, but the decedent's surviving dependents receive damages
as solace for their loss.70 If an injured person dies from the injuries,
61. American Inst. of Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Womble Realty, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 473 (Norfolk
1970).
62. Gimbert v. Rowley, 6 Va. Cir. 435 (Norfolk 1964); see also Gannt v. Kay Management,
Inc., 8 Va. Cir. 221 (Alexandria 1986).
63. Cottrell v. West, 6 Va. Cir. 440 (Norfolk 1969).
64. Dixon v. Robertson, 5 Va. Cir. 544 (Henrico County 1979).
65. Rasnick v. Pittston Co., 5 Va. Cir. 336 (Wise County 1986); Pierce v. AVCO Fin.
Servs., 7 Va. Cir. 420 (Richmond 1972).
66. Ghaffarian v. Ghaffarian, 6 Va. Cir. 345 (Fairfax County 1986).
67. Dodson v. Dodson, 6 Va. Cir. 196 (Fairfax County 1985).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
69. Id. § 8.01-25.
70. Bagley v. Weaver, 211 Va. 779, 180 S.E.2d 686 (1971) (injured plaintiff died of natural
causes).
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only a wrongful death action may be brought.7 1 If an injured per-
son sues and then dies of those injuries, then the action for per-
sonal injury is transformed into an action for wrongful death.72 If
an injured person dies but it is unclear whether the death resulted
from those injuries, then, according to a recent ruling, the only ac-
tion available is one for wrongful death."
An action for personal injury not resulting in the death of the
plaintiff's decedent can probably be pleaded alternatively with one
for wrongful death where the cause of death is at issue.74 The
Wrongful Death Statute forbids the survival of actions for personal
injury only where the wrongful death has been alleged or estab-
lished. If there was no wrongful death, then there should be com-
pensation for personal injuries. Thus, these separate and indepen-
dent causes of action should be allowed as alternatives though not
as cumulative remedies. Otherwise, a jury might find that the de-
fendant injured the decedent but that the injury did not kill him.
The plaintiff would then have to initiate a new action for personal
injury, if it were not barred by the statute of limitations.
C. Declaratory Judgments
Declaratory judgment proceedings may not be used as a substi-
tute for regular and adequate remedies. An adequate remedy at
law does not mean a perfect remedy.75 However, an action for a
declaratory judgment must be based on a justiciable case or con-
troversy. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide for advi-
sory opinions.7 The interpretation of a statute is a proper subject
for a declaratory judgment.7 7 A county can be made a defendant in
a declaratory judgment action to construe a zoning ordinance.78 A
third party claim under Rule 3:10 may seek declaratory relief.7 9
Where a party is being prosecuted in the general district court
71. Orne v. Kendrick, 6 Va. Cir. 136 (Richmond 1984); Rhodes v. Painter, 6 Va. Cir. 68
(Fredericksburg 1983).
72. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-25, -56 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
73. Anderson v. Fleming, 6 Va. Cir. 208 (Dickenson County 1985); see also Rhodes v.
Painter, 6 Va. Cir. 68 (Fredericksburg 1983).
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-281 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
75. Berry v. Hartford Cas. Co., 5 Va. Cir. 481 (Richmond 1977) (construing former VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-585 (Repl. Vol. 1957), present § 8.01-191 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
76. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jeffers, 7 Va. Cir. 107 (Richmond 1982).
77. Tony Guiffre Distrib. Co. v. A.B.C. Comm'n, 5 Va. Cir. 243 (Alexandria 1985).
78. Moore Bros. v. Augusta County, 5 Va. Cir. 454 (Augusta County 1974).
79. Shaw v. Sean Enter., Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 191 (Fairfax County 1985).
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and he then sues in the circuit court for a declaratory judgment on
the same issues and for an injunction, the circuit court will stay its
suit until the district court has rendered a judgment."
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A. General
An action filed in the clerk's office on the last day allowed by the
statute of limitations but after the normal business hours of the
clerk's office is not timely filed.8 '
Although section 8.01-229 tolls the statute of limitations for
plaintiffs who take nonsuits, it does not apply to cross-claims be-
tween defendants in nonsuited actions.2
Bringing a new party into a suit is a new and different demand
which does not relate back to the original filing, and the statute of
limitations is not tolled until the new party is brought in.s3 A
plaintiff cannot toll the statute of limitations by suing an unknown
person under the name of John Doe. To call an unknown person
John Doe is not a misnomer but a misdescription s4
B. Accrual
The statute of limitations period does not start to run until the
plaintiff has sustained an injury. Where a negligently designed and
manufactured appliance causes a fire, the cause of action for negli-
gence accrues on the date of the fire. 5 The action accrues, how-
ever, when the damage occurs whether the injured party discovers
the damage or not. 6
In a professional malpractice case, the statute of limitations
starts to run when the course of professional advice ends."7 This
80. Fraternal Order of Police v. Fairfax County, 7 Va. Cir. 349 (Fairfax County 1986).
81. Vaillancourt v. Paton, 6 Va. Cir. 344 (Newport News 1986).
82. Tillman v. Tayloe Dev. Corp., 5 Va. Cir. 137 (Alexandria 1984).
83. United Inc. v. National Capital, 8 Va. Cir. 48 (Alexandria 1982).
84. Carroll v. Charles E. Smith, Inc., 8 Va. Cir. 222 (Alexandria 1986).
85. Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 232 Va. 365, 350 S.E.2d 629 (1986) (no damage had oc-
curred before the appliance allegedly set fire to the plaintiff's house).
86. Evans v. National Hosp. for Orthopaedics & Rehabilitation, 5 Va. Cir. 385 (Arlington
County 1986) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
87. Keller v. Denny, 236 Va. 512, 352 S.E.2d 327 (1987); Virginia Corp. v. Hessler, 5 Va.
Cir. 247 (Alexandria 1985) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1984)); Cockrell
v. Brogan, 7 Va. Cir. 176 (Warren County 1982) (applying VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl.
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"continuing treatment" rule does not apply to pharmacists.88 A
claim for professional malpractice cannot be characterized as a
claim for a mistake in having paid the fee in order to delay the
accrual of the cause of action. 9 An action for professional negli-
gence is one for a breach of contract."0
Where persons maintain a continuous course of interrelated ser-
vices, a cause of action does not accrue until the services are termi-
nated. Thus, where a client is represented by the same attorney
over a long period of time in reference to many interrelated trans-
actions, the attorney can sue for all of his fees within three years of
the last transaction.91
A cause of action for fraud accrues when the fraud is discovered
or should have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence.92
Where libelous material is published more than once, the cause of
action arises when the material was first made available to the
public.9 3 A cause of action for subrogation accrues when the pay-
ment is made by the subrogee. A subrogation action is governed by
the three-year limitation of section 8.01-246(4). 94
A cause of action for contribution against a joint tortfeasor does
not accrue until payment of the judgment or claim. The recent
amendment to the tolling provisions of the statutes of limitations,
section 8.01-229(I), applies to causes of action that have accrued
but have not been brought. Section 8.01-229(I) extends for sixty
days any limitation period for third party claims when the original
action is brought within thirty days before the expiration of the
limitation period.9 5
An insurance policy with a limitation period required by statute
does not transform the limitation into a mere contractual agree-
Vol. 1984)); Smith v. Hampton, 7 Va. Cir. 168 (Alexandria 1982); Roussell v. Clark, 7 Va.
Cir. 99 (Richmond 1982); Branca v. Northern Va. Doctors Hosp., 5 Va. Cir. 19 (Arlington
County 1981); Bottomly v. Sullivan, 7 Va. Cir. 484 (Arlington County 1978); Donovan v.
Deyerle, 8 Va. Cir. 464 (Richmond 1963).
88. Coakley v. Orr, 6 Va. Cir. 170 (Loudoun County 1984).
89. Cockrell v. Brogan, 7 Va. Cir. 176 (Warren County 1982).
90. Roussell v. Clark, 7 Va. Cir. 99 (Richmond 1982); Smith v. Hampton, 7 Va. Cir. 168
(Alexandria 1982); Branca v. Northern Va. Doctors Hosp., 5 Va. Cir. 19 (Arlington County
1981); Bottomly v. Sullivan, 7 Va. Cir. 484 (Arlington County 1978).
91. Wood v. Carwile, 231 Va. 320, 343 S.E.2d 346 (1986).
92. Wood v. Feddon, 5 Va. Cir. 228 (Alexandria 1985) (construing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-249 (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
93. Moon v. CBS, Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 68 (Richmond 1981).
94. GEICO v. Haffey, 6 Va. Cir. 433 (Norfolk 1963).
95. Vaughan v. Callear, 5 Va. Cir. 366 (Richmond 1986).
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ment. Therefore, section 8.01-229(E)(3) allows a suit on such a pol-
icy to be recommenced within six months of a nonsuit e6
Where a defendant conceals a right of action from the plaintiff,
the statute of limitations is tolled until the cause of action is dis-
covered.97 Only actual concealment, involving fraud and moral tur-
pitude will toll the statute of limitations.e8 Fraud necessary to toll
the running of the statute of limitations must be such as is in-
tended "to conceal the discovery of the cause of action by trick or
artifice and must have thus actually concealed it."99 Arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and erroneous actions will not toll the statute of
limitations.100
C. Time Limits
Section 8.01-248 is a general statute of limitations for personal
actions for which no other statute of limitations applies. There are
other statutes which clearly apply to contracts, to property rights,
and to personal injuries. The one-year period of section 8.01-248
refers to personal actions but not to personal, physical injuries.
Thus, section 8.01-248 applies to actions for defamation, 10 insult-
ing words,10 2 wrongful termination of employment, 0 3 malicious
prosecution and abuse of process, 04 false imprisonment,1 05 and hu-
miliation arising from a battery. 0 6
An action for personal injury must be brought within two
years. 10 7 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm is gov-
96. Tolley v. Southern Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Va. Cir. 23 (Henrico County 1980).
97. Marshall v. Robinson, 6 Va. Cir. 1 (Norfolk 1980).
98. Maroto v. Weddle, 6 Va. Cir. 360 (Virginia Beach 1986).
99. Midland-Ross Corp. v. Adamson Co., 6 Va. Cir. 512 (Richmond 1977); see also Dono-
van v. Deyerle, 8 Va. Cir. 464 (Richmond 1963).
100. John Driggs Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. Cir. 53 (Richmond 1981).
101. Ellison v. St. Mary's Hosp., 8 Va. Cir. 330 (Henrico County 1987); Marshall v. Medi-
cal Facilities of Am., Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 410 (Lynchburg 1986); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Ashcraft
& Gerel, 3 Va. Cir. 143 (Alexandria 1983); Beasley v. Kayo Oil Co., 3 Va. Cir. 119 (Chester-
field County 1983); Moon v. CBS, Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 68 (Richmond 1981); Gaines v. Safeway
Stores, 7 Va. Cir. 468 (Richmond 1977).
102. Gaines, 7 Va. Cir. 468.
103. Medical Facilities, 6 Va. Cir. 410; Crowder v. Chap Stick Co., 6 Va. Cir. 115 (Lynch-
burg 1984).
104. Crowder, 6 Va. Cir. 115; Beasley, 3 Va. Cir. 119; Ferguson v. Flinchum, 7 Va. Cir. 373
(Roanoke 1959).
105. Beasley, 3 Va. Cir. 119; Gaines, 7 Va. Cir. 468; Ferguson, 7 Va. Cir. 373.
106. Gaines, 7 Va. Cir. 468.
107. Evans v. National Hosp., 5 Va. Cir. 385 (Arlington County 1986) (applying VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986)).
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erned by the two-year statute of limitations of section 8.01-
243(A). 10 1 A cause of action for personal injuries arising out of an
innkeeper's duty to protect his guests is also covered by this sec-
tion.10 9 Section 8.01-243(A) was recently amended to give a two-
year limitations period for actions for damages resulting from
fraud.
An action for direct damage to property must be brought within
five years of accrual, but an action for indirect damages must be
brought within one year. 110 An action for conversions of personal
property must be brought within the five-year limitations period of
section 8.01-243(B).1
In a contract for the sale of real estate, a misrepresentation of
the number of habitable units results in damage to the buyer's
property interest, and therefore, section 8.01-243(B) is applica-
ble.1 1 2 A suit for breach of warranty against structural defects
sounds in contract and the right accrues on the date of breach, in
this case, when the repairs were completed.11 3 An action for negli-
gence resulting in damage to property is governed by the five-year
statute of limitations, and accrues at the time of injury.1 4
An elevator is machinery and not an improvement to real prop-
erty for the purposes of the section 8.01-250 limitations period. 1 5
An action for negligence of an attorney in performance of profes-
sional services while sounding in tort is an actual breach of con-
tract, and thus it is governed by the three-year statute of limita-
tions applicable to contracts, section 8.01-246(4).111 A suit to
impose a constructive trust must be brought within five years after
the right accrues.117
108. Medical Facilities, 6 Va. Cir. 410.
109. Mulliken v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 466 (Spotsylvania County 1977).
110. Wolf v. Groh, 5 Va. Cir. 217 (Virginia Beach 1984).
111. Commercial and Say. Bank v. Coss Welding Supply, Inc., 8 Va. Cir. 59 (Winchester
1983).
112. Roussell v. Clark, 7,Va. Cir. 99 (Richmond 1982) (applying the five-year limitations
period).
113. Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 348 S.E.2d 252 (1986) (construing
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
114. Tannery House Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n v. Development Resources, Inc., 8
Va. Cir. 207 (Alexandria 1986).
115. Sanders v. Reynolds Assoc., 8 Va. Cir. 162 (Alexandria 1986).
116. Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 352 S.E.2d 327 (1987); Virginia Corp. v. Hessler, 5 Va.
Cir. 247 (Alexandria 1985); Roussell v. Clark, 7 Va. Cir. 99 (Richmond 1982).
117. Foltz v. Foltz, 5 Va. Cir. 141 (Frederick County 1984) (construing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-24 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (recodified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984))).
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The constitutionality of the disparity in time limits for suing on
foreign judgments as opposed to domestic judgments was consid-
ered in the case of Carter v. Carter."18 Four Justices of the Virginia
Supreme Court felt that the disparity was constitutional; three
thought not.
VII. DISCOVERY
In Seabrook v. Health Group,119 the plaintiff made 756 requests
for admissions. The court held that the sheer volume and scope of
requests for admissions alone made them objectionable.
Income tax returns are discoverable if they relate to damages al-
leged by the plaintiff. A party must disclose communications from
his attorney unless such communications would reveal privileged
matters confided by him to his attorney. 120 The work product doc-
trine applies to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by
persons who are not parties to the pending litigation. Where the
witnesses are freely available to all parties, there is no good cause
to violate the work product privilege. 12 1 A document prepared in
the course of employment is not privileged from discovery unless it
was made in anticipation of litigation. 122
Section 63.1-53, which provides for the confidentiality of welfare
records, prohibits the voluntary disclosure by their custodians.
When they are called for by a subpoena duces tecum, however,
they must be produced. 23
A person is not required to respond to discovery in a civil suit if
it may result in self-incrimination in a later criminal prosecution.
"Use immunity" is an insufficient protection, but if the person has
a "blanket immunity" from prosecution, he will be compelled to
respond in the civil action. 124 An attorney may assert his client's
privilege against self-incrimination. 12 5
A required blood test to determine paternity does not violate a
118. 232 Va. 166, 349 S.E.2d 95 (1986) (construing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-252, -251 (Cum.
Supp. 1987)).
119. 8 Va. Cir. 220 (Alexandria 1986).
120. Eden, Hannon & Co. v. Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, 8 Va. Cir. 225 (Alexandria 1986).
121. Harris v. Skyhook Corp., 8 Va. Cir. 307 (Richmond 1987).
122. Mayfield v. District of Columbia, 8 Va. Cir. 157 (Alexandria 1986).
123. Meckenberg v. Becker, 5 Va. Cir. 458 (Arlington County 1974).
124. Security Title Guar. Corp. v. Brice, 5 Va. Cir. 226 (Virginia Beach 1985).
125. Jiorle v. Jiorle, 7 Va. Cir. 535 (Arlington County 1979).
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person's privilege against self-incrimination. The power to order a
blood test implies the power to order the alleged father to pay the
expenses of making the test and of calling witnesses.12 Where a
court was unable to determine paternity, the order dismissing the
case is not a bar to later litigation of the same issue."'
Since the attorney-client privilege exists only to protect the cli-
ent, only the client can waive it. 2" An inadvertent disclosure does
not waive an attorney's work product privilege.1 29
An expert witness is one whose first connection with the case is a
result of his employment to testify. Therefore, a physician who
treats a party before the litigation is a fact witness, not an expert
witness.1 30 A defendant physician must give his expert opinion as
to the standard of care in a particular community, and he must
answer as to whether he adhered to that standard of care."'
City council members may be required to give depositions to dis-
cover the motives and actions of third parties. 32 As a general rule,
the expenses of a deponent in attending a deposition will be reim-
bursed by the party requiring the deposition.133
The dismissal of a party for failing to respond to interrogatories
is with prejudice.134 An attorney who fails to make timely discovery
may be required to pay the costs and attorney's fees for making a
motion for sanctions even though no sanctions are applied. 35 How-
ever, where both parties are unreasonable as to discovery, sanc-
tions under Rule 4:12 will not be granted against either party.136
VIII. INCIDENTS OF TRIAL
A plaintiff can take a nonsuit after an unfavorable ruling on an
issue of misjoinder of parties. 37 The date of a nonsuit is the date
126. Commonwealth v. Jones, 6 Va. Cir. 296 (Lee County 1986).
127. Commonwealth v. Curry, 6 Va. Cir. 211 (Rockingham County 1985).
128. Lataif v. Restaurant Equities, Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 514 (Arlington County 1978).
129. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 6 Va. Cir. 240 (Richmond 1985).
130. Brunson v. Daughtrity, 6 Va. Cir. 459 (Norfolk 1969).
131. Blaisdell v. Johnson, 6 Va. Cir. 252 (Fredericksburg 1985); Gerwin v. Moss, 6 Va. Cir.
113 (Virginia Beach 1984).
132. Virginia Beach Telecom. Corp. v. Cox Cable Communications, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 526
(Norfolk 1977).
133. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Huxtable, 6 Va. Cir. 7 (Norfolk 1981).
134. Murphy v. City of Virginia Beach, 6 Va. Cir. 140 (Virginia Beach 1984).
135. Daber, Inc. v. Corbisiero, 7 Va. Cir. 532 (Richmond 1979).
136. Benze v. Ross, 6 Va. Cir. 11 (Norfolk 1981).
137. Rasnick v. Pittston Co., 5 Va. Cir. 336 (Wise County 1986).
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on which it is requested by the plaintiff, not the date of the judge's
order. The six month period of section 8.01-229(E)(3) begins when
the plaintiff acts to end the suit." 8
A continuance should not be granted when a witness is absent
unless his testimony would be material and not merely cumulative,
and the witness will be present at a future date. If the object of the
motion is to delay the trial, it should not be granted.139
Although witnesses are usually excluded from the courtroom
during trials, a recent amendment to section 8.01-375 provides that
"[w]here expert witnesses are to testify in the case, the court may,
at the request of all parties, allow one expert witness for each
party to remain in the courtroom. "140 This will significantly in-
crease the effectiveness of the cross-examination of expert
testimony.
IX. VERDICTS AND JUDGMENTS
Upon a motion to set aside a verdict on the ground of jury mis-
conduct or bias, the presiding judge should "investigate the
charges" by examining the juror who was the subject of the com-
plaint.' Where a person is sued under his business name, is
served with process, and appears at a trial, a verdict against him is
valid over objections on the grounds of misnomer. 42
A judgment may be set aside for fraud in the procurement of the
judgment but not for fraud in the procurement of the underlying
contract. In an action of debt on a foreign judgment, no counter-
claim barred by the foreign judgment can be prosecuted in
Virginia. " 3
Punitive damages for breach of contract are awarded only in the
most exceptional circumstances. Virginia will not give full faith
and credit to a foreign judgment in a contracts case where the
138. Morrison v. Bestler, 8 Va. Cir. 456, 457 (Roanoke County 1987); see also Hating v.
Stephenson, 8 Va. Cir. 381 (Fairfax County 1987); Burton v. Fifer, 5 Va. Cir. 230 (Char-
lottesville 1985).
139. Watson v. Dailey, 5 Va. Cir. 427 (Richmond 1970).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-375 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
141. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Moorefield, 231 Va. 260, 343 S.E.2d 329 (1986).
142. Douglas v. San Francisco Hairport, 5 Va. Cir. 318 (Richmond 1986).
143. American Inst. of Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Womble Realty, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 473 (Norfolk
1970).
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judge has lightly granted punitive damages. It is against Virginia's
clear public policy.""
Where notice of a hearing date is not given to all parties entitled
to notice, any order entered is void under Rule 1:13. A void order
can be set aside at any time.145
X. COURT COSTS; ATTORNEYS' FEES; INTEREST
In 1987, the General Assembly enacted a statute which requires
attorneys and parties not represented by counsel to certify to the
court that all pleadings and motions are made in good faith and
not for any improper purpose. 146 This statute, which follows the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11,147 also requires the judge, if
he finds a violation, to impose appropriate sanctions including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees upon the offending lawyer or party or
both.'4" This new statute goes considerably beyond the present
Virginia Rules of Court. 49 It also goes beyond present Federal
Rule 11 in that it expressly includes oral motions. The statute ap-
plies in both district and circuit courts.
Whether section 8.01-271.1 applies to nonsuits is unclear. It
might be argued that a nonsuit is neither a pleading nor a motion.
A nonsuit can be used in bad faith since it is a withdrawal of an
action without prejudice. If a plaintiff does not prepare for trial
hoping to settle his claim before trial, perhaps even on the morning
of the trial, he knows that if the settlement fails to materialize, he
can nonsuit the action. However, the defendant must always pre-
pare for trial in the event that there is no last minute settlement.
If the defendant has brought in expert witnesses and the plaintiff
nonsuits, the defendant loses a significant sum of money. It seems
only fair that the nonsuiting plaintiff pay the expenses of the de-
fendant's expert witnesses and attorney in such cases. Settlements
are encouraged and it may well be that a nonsuit is not taken for
an "improper purpose." Nevertheless the costs of the nonsuit to
the defendant should be shifted to the plaintiff.
The defendant who has paid into court the amount of the judg-
144. Schwaber v. Steele, 6 Va. Cir. 274 (Spotsylvania County 1985).
145. Norfolk Div. of Social Servs. v. Unknown Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533
(1986).
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
147. FED. R CIV. P. 11.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
149. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:4(a).
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ment before trial, is deemed to have prevailed on the issues and
should recover costs. 150 An in-state, non-expert witness attending a
civil trial is entitled to reimbursement of transportation expenses.
Such expenses are taxable as court costs. 151 Reimbursable court
costs include the clerk's fee for the preparation of the appeal rec-
ord, but not the fees of a court reporter, the costs of a transcript,
premiums on supersedeas bonds, or discovery depositions. 52
Attorneys' fees may not be included in arbitration awards. At-
torneys' fees are not a part of the administrative expenses of
arbitration.15 3
In its verdict, a jury has the discretion to award interest pay-
ments, but it cannot change the rate of interest from the statutory
rate.15 The legal rate of interest, rather than the judgment rate of
interest, applies to debts found to be owing by the defendant to
the plaintiff before entry of final judgment.155 A judgment will in-
clude the contracted for finance charges, but after judgment, the
judgment rate of interest applies to the unpaid judgment. 5 '
When a plaintiff in detinue, after taking possession of the goods
in dispute, removes them from the state and then takes a nonsuit,
the defendant is entitled to reimbursement for any damages result-
ing from such action. 57
XI. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
Where summary judgment for the plaintiff is granted but a trial
on a counterclaim is pending, execution of the judgment on behalf
of the plaintiff will be stayed until after the trial.'
Section 8.01-506 was amended at the last session of the General
Assembly to permit debtor interrogatories to be used to discover
150. Providence Forge Oil Co. v. C & P Tel. Co., 8 Va. Cir. 470 (Richmond 1966).
151. G.L. Hopkins, Inc. v. C & 0 Dev. Co., 6 Va. Cir. 546 (Norfolk 1978).
152. Herrick v. Quality Home Builders of Norfolk, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 467 (Norfolk 1970).
153. E.B. Rudiger & Sons v. Norfolk Air Conditioning Corp., 7 Va. Cir. 200 (Norfolk
1983).
154. Kohne v. Intermodal Servs., Inc., 5 Va. Cir. 294 (Alexandria 1985) (construing '..
CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
155. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 8 Va. Cir. 228 (Henrico County 1986).
156. Norfolk Sash & Door Co. v. International Insulating Sys., Inc., 7 Va. Cir. 153 (Nor-
folk 1982).
157. J.I. Case Co. v. United Va. Bank, 232 Va. 210, 349 S.E.2d 120 (1986).
158. CAS, Inc. v. Skylight, Inc., 5 Va. Cir. 56 (Alexandria 1982).
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the existence and location of intangible as well as tangible
property.'
XII. APPELLATE PRACTICE
The major change in Virginia appellate practice last year was an
addition to the supreme court's jurisdiction. By an amendment to
article VI, section 1, of the Constitution of Virginia, the Virginia
Supreme Court is now expressly permitted "to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States or the highest
appellate court of any other state."'160 This new jurisdiction is gov-
erned by Rule 5:42,161 which is based on the Uniform Certification
of Questions of Law Act. 62 The Uniform Act was changed in many
places to give more specific procedural guidance, but the general
substantive intent remains intact.
It is within the discretion of a federal or.other state court to
certify a question of Virginia law to the Virginia Supreme Court,
and it is entirely within the discretion of the supreme court to ac-
cept such a certification. In diversity and habeas corpus cases, fed-
eral courts sitting in Virginia are often called upon to decide novel
points of Virginia law. The ability to certify such problems to the
highest state court for resolution will greatly aid in the administra-
tion of justice and will avoid the incongruity of having the only
case on a point of Virginia law coming from a different system and
being subject to later disapproval by the Virginia Supreme Court.
The certification is made by the foreign court, not by the parties.
Such a certification must state the relevant facts of the case and
the question of law that is in doubt. There also should be a "brief
statement" as to how the question affects the pending litigation
and why any relevant Virginia case authority is not controlling.
The Virginia Supreme Court may, in any particular case, also ask
for a copy of the record, request a clarification of the question, or
restate the question.
Pursuant to Rule 5:42(e), 63 the supreme court will notify the
certifying court and the litigants whether the certification has been
accepted, whether oral presentation will be permitted, and the
dates for briefing and argument. This permits the certifying court
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-506 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
160. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
161. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:42.
162. UNIF. CERT. AcT, 12 U.L.A. 52-56 (1975).
163. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:42(e).
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to withdraw its certification if it believes that the schedule will be
so time-consuming as to be unduly prejudicial to the parties. The
Supreme Court of Virginia may revoke its acceptance of a question
certified to it. If the parties settle the case, the certification process
ends. Any opinion that the Virginia Supreme Court issues will be
of precedential value and will be published in the Virginia
Reports.
Certification promotes federalism by according proper deference
to state courts as the authoritative arbiters of state law. Certification
may also be preferable to abstention because it does not require the
state court to go through a redetermination or relitigation of facts.
Certification may also be more expeditious and less expensive to the
parties. 64
Section 8.01-676.1, which provides for appeal bonds, was re-
cently amended in several respects. Subsection C, which deals with
supersedeas bonds now provides that such bonds are continuing
bonds and are thus in effect throughout the appellate process. A
new subsection KI was enacted that allows a claimant appealing
an adverse decision of the Industrial Commission to move for a
waiver of the appeal bond requirement if his injuries are prevent-
ing his return to work. Finally, subsection M was added to the
statute to allow a single judge of the court of appeals to rule on
motions concerning bonds.'65
A transcript is indispensable to the disposition of an appeal, and
therefore, its filing is jurisdictional. The time for filing a transcript
may be extended by the trial court upon a request made before the
deadline of Rule 5A:8(a), but not afterwards. 66 Rule 5:11(b) was
recently amended to require that the notice given to other counsel
of the filing of the transcript be in writing and be given within five
days. A copy of this written notice must be filed with the clerk of
the trial court and must contain a certificate of mailing to or ac-
ceptance by all other counsel in the case. This amendment solves
the problems of whether written or oral notice is required, what is
prompt notice, and what is necessary to prove that notice was
given.117
164. T. S. Ellis, III, Memorandum to the Boyd-Graves Conference, Oct. 24, 1986, at 5.
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
166. Jordan v. Price, 3 Va. App. 672, 353 S.E.2d 168 (1987).
167. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:11(b).
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Neither a school board nor a board of zoning appeals is an ad-
ministrative agency of the state government. Therefore, circuit
court actions relating to their decisions are appealable to the su-
preme court and not to the court of appeals. 1 8 On the other hand,
the Department of Highways and Transportation is considered an
administrative agency, 6e and its decisions are appealable to the
Virginia Court of Appeals.
168. Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 223 Va. 37, 353 S.E.2d 727 (1987); Virginia
Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 344 S.E.2d 899
(1986); Schwartz v. Highland County School Bd., 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986),
dismissing an appeal from 3 Va. Cir. 395 (1985); see also Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of
Alexandria, 231 Va. 421, 344 S.E.2d 903 (1986).
169. Commonwealth v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17, 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).
1987]

